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whom　wealth　is　likely　to　continue　longer　in　the　same　families。

　　　　　Birth　and　fortune　are　evidently　the　two　circumstances　which

principally　set　one　man　above　another。　They　are　the　two　great

sources　of　personal　distinction；　and　are　therefore　the　principal

causes　which　naturally　establish　authority　and　subordination

among　men。　Among　nations　of　shepherds　both　those　causes　operate

with　their　full　force。　The　great　shepherd　or　herdsman；　respected

on　account　of　his　great　wealth；　and　of　the　great　number　of　those

who　depend　upon　him　for　subsistence；　and　revered　on　account　of

the　nobleness　of　his　birth；　and　of　the　immemorial　antiquity　of

his　illustrious　family；　has　a　natural　authority　over　all　the

inferior　shepherds　or　herdsmen　of　his　horde　or　clan。　He　can

command　the　united　force　of　a　greater　number　of　people　than　any

of　them。　His　military　power　is　greater　than　that　of　any　of　them。

In　time　of　war　they　are　all　of　them　naturally　disposed　to　muster

themselves　under　his　banner；　rather　than　under　that　of　any　other

person；　and　his　birth　and　fortune　thus　naturally　procure　to　him

some　sort　of　executive　power。　By　commanding；　too；　the　united

force　of　a　greater　number　of　people　than　any　of　them；　he　is　best

able　to　compel　any　one　of　them　who　may　have　injured　another　to

compensate　the　wrong。　He　is　the　person；　therefore；　to　whom　all

those　who　are　too　weak　to　defend　themselves　naturally　look　up　for

protection。　It　is　to　him　that　they　naturally　complain　of　the

injuries　which　they　imagine　have　been　done　to　them；　and　his

interposition　in　such　cases　is　more　easily　submitted　to；　even　by

the　person　complained　of；　than　that　of　any　other　person　would　be。

His　birth　and　fortune　thus　naturally　procure　him　some　sort　of

judicial　authority。

　　　　　It　is　in　the　age　of　shepherds；　in　the　second　period　of

society；　that　the　inequality　of　fortune　first　begins　to　take

place；　and　introduces　among　men　a　degree　of　authority　and

subordination　which　could　not　possibly　exist　before。　It　thereby

introduces　some　degree　of　that　civil　government　which　is

indispensably　necessary　for　its　own　preservation：　and　it　seems　to

do　this　naturally；　and　even　independent　of　the　consideration　of

that　necessity。　The　consideration　of　that　necessity　comes　no

doubt　afterwards　to　contribute　very　much　to　maintain　and　secure

that　authority　and　subordination。　The　rich；　in　particular；　are

necessarily　interested　to　support　that　order　of　things　which　can

alone　secure　them　in　the　possession　of　their　own　advantages。　Men

of　inferior　wealth　combine　to　defend　those　of　superior　wealth　in

the　possession　of　their　property；　in　order　that　men　of　superior

wealth　may　combine　to　defend　them　in　the　possession　of　theirs。

All　the　inferior　shepherds　and　herdsmen　feel　that　the　security　of

their　own　herds　and　flocks　depends　upon　the　security　of　those　of

the　great　shepherd　or　herdsman；　that　the　maintenance　of　their

lesser　authority　depends　upon　that　of　his　greater　authority；　and

that　upon　their　subordination　to　him　depends　his　power　of　keeping

their　inferiors　in　subordination　to　them。　They　constitute　a　sort

of　little　nobility；　who　feel　themselves　interested　to　defend　the

property　and　to　support　the　authority　of　their　own　little

sovereign　in　order　that　he　may　be　able　to　defend　their　property

and　to　support　their　authority。　Civil　government；　so　far　as　it　is

instituted　for　the　security　of　property；　is　in　reality　instituted

for　the　defence　of　the　rich　against　the　poor；　or　of　those　who

have　some　property　against　those　who　have　none　at　all。

　　　　　The　judicial　authority　of　such　a　sovereign；　however；　far

from　being　a　cause　of　expense；　was　for　a　long　time　a　source　of

revenue　to　him。　The　persons　who　applied　to　him　for　justice　were

always　willing　to　pay　for　it；　and　a　present　never　failed　to

accompany　a　petition。　After　the　authority　of　the　sovereign；　too；

was　thoroughly　established；　the　person　found　guilty；　over　and

above　the　satisfaction　which　he　was　obliged　to　make　to　the　party；

was　likewise　forced　to　pay　an　amercement　to　the　sovereign。　He　had

given　trouble；　he　had　disturbed；　he　had　broke　the　peace　of　his

lord　the　king；　and　for　those　offences　an　amercement　was　thought

due。　In　the　Tartar　governments　of　Asia；　in　the　governments　of

Europe　which　were　founded　by　the　German　and　Scythian　nations　who

overturned　the　Roman　empire；　the　administration　of　justice　was　a

considerable　source　of　revenue；　both　to　the　sovereign　and　to　all

the　lesser　chiefs　or　lords　who　exercised　under　him　any　particular

jurisdiction；　either　over　some　particular　tribe　or　clan；　or　over

some　particular　territory　or　district。　Originally　both　the

sovereign　and　the　inferior　chiefs　used　to　exercise　this

jurisdiction　in　their　own　persons。　Afterwards　they　universally

found　it　convenient　to　delegate　it　to　some　substitute；　bailiff；

or　judge。　This　substitute；　however；　was　still　obliged　to　account

to　his　principal　or　constituent　for　the　profits　of　the

jurisdiction。　Whoever　reads　the　instructions　which　were　given　to

the　judges　of　the　circuit　in　the　time　of　Henry　II　will　see

clearly　that　those　judges　were　a　sort　of　itinerant　factors；　sent

round　the　country　for　the　purpose　of　levying　certain　branches　of

the　king's　revenue。　In　those　days　the　administration　of　justice

not　only　afforded　a　certain　revenue　to　the　sovereign；　but　to

procure　this　revenue　seems　to　have　been　one　of　the　principal

advantages　which　he　proposed　to　obtain　by　the　administration　of

justice。

　　　　　This　scheme　of　making　the　administration　of　justice

subservient　to　the　purposes　of　revenue　could　scarce　fail　to　be

productive　of　several　very　gross　abuses。　The　person　who　applied

for　justice　with　a　large　present　in　his　hand　was　likely　to　get

something　more　than　justice；　while　he　who　applied　for　it　with　a

small　one　was　likely　to　get　something　less。　Justice；　too；　might

frequently　be　delayed　in　order　that　this　present　might　be

repeated。　The　amercement；　besides；　of　the　person　complained　of；

might　frequently　suggest　a　very　strong　reason　for　finding　him　in

the　wrong；　even　when　he　had　not　really　been　so。　That　such　abuses

were　far　from　being　uncommon　the　ancient　history　of　every　country

in　Europe　bears　witness。

　　　　　When　the　sovereign　or　chief　exercised　his　judicial　authority

in　his　own　person；　how　much　soever　he　might　abuse　it；　it　must

have　been　scarce　possible　to　get　any　redress；　because　there　could

seldom　be　anybody　powerful　enough　to　call　him　to　account。　When　he

exercised　it　by　a　bailiff；　indeed；　redress　might　sometimes　be

had。　If　it　was　for　his　own　benefit　only　that　the　bailiff　had　been

guilty　of　any　act　of　injustice；　the　sovereign　himself　might　not

always　be　unwilling　to　punish　him；　or　to　oblige　him　to　repair　the

wrong。　But　if　it　was　for　the　benefit　of　his　sovereign；　if　it　was

in　order　to　make　court　to　the　person　who　appointed　him　and　who

might　prefer　him；　that　he　had　committed　any　act　of　oppression；

redress　would　upon　most　occasions　be　as　impossible　as　if　the

sovereign　had　committed　it　himself。　In　all　barbarous　governments；

accordingly；　in　all　those　ancient　governments　of　Europe　in

particular　which　were　founded　upon　the　ruins　of　the　Roman　empire；

the　administration　of　justice　appears　for　a　long　time　to　have

been　extremely　corrupt；　far　from　being　quite　equal　and　impartial

even　under　the　best　monarchs；　and　altogether　profligate　under　the

worst。

　　　　　Among　nations　of　shepherds；　where　the　sovereign　or　chief　is

only　the　greatest　shepherd　or　herdsman　of　the　horde　or　clan；　he

is　maintained　in　the　same　manner　as　any　of　his　vassals　or

subjects；　by　the　increase　of　his　own　herds　or　flocks。　Among　those

nations　of　husbandmen　who　are　but　just　come　out　of　the　shepherd

state；　and　who　are　not　much　advanced　beyond　that　state；　such　as

the　Greek　tribes　appear　to　have　been　about　the　time　of　the　Trojan

war；　and　our　German　and　Scythian　ancestors　when　they　first

settled　upon　the　ruins　of　the　western　empire；　the　sovereign　or

chief　is；　in　the　same　manner；　only　the　greatest　landlord　of　the

country；　and　is　maintained；　in　the　same　manner　as　any　other

landlord；　by　a　revenue　derived　from　his　own　private　estate；　or

from　what；　in　modern　Europe；　was　called　the　demesne　of　the　crown。

His　subjects；　upon　ordinary　occasions；　contributed　nothing　to　his

support；　except　when；　in　order　to　protect　them　from　the

oppression　of　some　of　their　fellow…subjects；　they　stand　in　need

of　his　authority。　The　presents　which　they　make　him　upon　such

occasions　constitute　the　whole　ordinary　revenue；　the　whole　of　the

emoluments　which；　except　perhaps　upon　some　very　extraordinary

emergencies；　he　derives　from　his　dominion　over　them。　When

Agamemnon；　in　Homer；　offers　to　Achilles　for　his　friendship　the

sovereignty　of　seven　Greek　cities；　the　sole　advantage　which　he

mentions　as　likely　to　be　derived　from　it　was　that　the　people

would　honour　him　with　presents。　As　long　as　such　presents；　as　long

as　the　emoluments　of　justice；　or　what　may　be　called　the　fees　of

court；　constituted　in　this　manner　the　w