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by　Nicolo　Machiavelli



Written　c。　1505；　published　1515



translated　by　W。　K。　Marriott



CHAPTER　I



HOW　MANY　KINDS　OF　PRINCIPALITIES　THERE　ARE；　AND　BY　WHAT　MEANS　THEY　ARE

ACQUIRED



ALL　STATES；　all　powers；　that　have　held　and　hold　rule　over　men　have　been

and　are　either　republics　or　principalities。



Principalities　are　either　hereditary；　in　which　the　family　has　been　long

established；　or　they　are　new。



The　new　are　either　entirely　new；　as　was　Milan　to　Francesco　Sforza；　or

they　are；　as　it　were；　members　annexed　to　the　hereditary　state　of　the

prince　who　has　acquired　them；　as　was　the　kingdom　of　Naples　to　that　of

the　King　of　Spain。



Such　dominions　thus　acquired　are　either　accustomed　to　live　under　a

prince；　or　to　live　in　freedom；　and　are　acquired　either　by　the　arms　of

the　prince　himself；　or　of　others；　or　else　by　fortune　or　by　ability。



CHAPTER　II



CONCERNING　HEREDITARY　PRINCIPALITIES



I　WILL　leave　out　all　discussion　on　republics；　inasmuch　as　in　another

place　I　have　written　of　them　at　length；　＇1＇　and　will　address　myself　only

to　principalities。　In　doing　so　I　will　keep　to　the　order　indicated　above；

and　discuss　how　such　principalities　are　to　be　ruled　and　preserved。



I　say　at　once　there　are　fewer　difficulties　in　holding　hereditary　states；

and　those　long　accustomed　to　the　family　of　their　prince；　than　new　ones；

for　it　is　sufficient　only　not　to　transgress　the　customs　of　his

ancestors；　and　to　deal　prudently　with　circumstances　as　they　arise；　for　a

prince　of　average　powers　to　maintain　himself　in　his　state；　unless　he　be

deprived　of　it　by　some　extraordinary　and　excessive　force；　and　if　he

should　be　so　deprived　of　it；　whenever　anything　sinister　happens　to　the

usurper；　he　will　regain　it。



We　have　in　Italy；　for　example；　the　Duke　of　Ferrara；　who　could　not　have

withstood　the　attacks　of　the　Venetians　in　'84；　nor　those　of　Pope　Julius

in　'10；　unless　he　had　been　long　established　in　his　dominions。　For　the

hereditary　prince　has　less　cause　and　less　necessity　to　offend；　hence　it

happens　that　he　will　be　more　loved；　and　unless　extraordinary　vices　cause

him　to　be　hated；　it　is　reasonable　to　expect　that　his　subjects　will　be

naturally　well　disposed　towards　him；　and　in　the　antiquity　and　duration

of　his　rule　the　memories　and　motives　that　make　for　change　are　lost；　for

one　change　always　leaves　the　toothing　for　another。



1。　Discourses。



CHAPTER　III



CONCERNING　MIXED　PRINCIPALITIES



BUT　the　difficulties　occur　in　a　new　principality。　And　firstly；　if　it　be

not　entirely　new；　but　is；　as　it　were；　a　member　of　a　state　which；　taken

collectively；　may　be　called　posite；　the　changes　arise　chiefly　from　an

inherent　difficulty　which　there　is　in　all　new　principalities；　for　men

change　their　rulers　willingly；　hoping　to　better　themselves；　and　this

hope　induces　them　to　take　up　arms　against　him　who　rules：　wherein　they

are　deceived；　because　they　afterwards　find　by　experience　they　have　gone

from　bad　to　worse。　This　follows　also　on　another　natural　and　mon

necessity；　which　always　causes　a　new　prince　to　burden　those　who　have

submitted　to　him　with　his　soldiery　and　with　infinite　other　hardships

which　he　must　put　upon　his　new　acquisition。



In　this　way　you　have　enemies　in　all　those　whom　you　have　injured　in

seizing　that　principality；　and　you　are　not　able　to　keep　those　friends

who　put　you　there　because　of　your　not　being　able　to　satisfy　them　in　the

way　they　expected；　and　you　cannot　take　strong　measures　against　them；

feeling　bound　to　them。　For；　although　one　may　be　very　strong　in　armed

forces；　yet　in　entering　a　province　one　has　always　need　of　the　goodwill

of　the　natives。



For　these　reasons　Louis　XII；　King　of　France；　quickly　occupied　Milan；　and

as　quickly　lost　it；　and　to　turn　him　out　the　first　time　it　only　needed

Lodovico's　own　forces；　because　those　who　had　opened　the　gates　to　him；

finding　themselves　deceived　in　their　hopes　of　future　benefit；　would　not

endure　the　ill…treatment　of　the　new　prince。　It　is　very　true　that；　after

acquiring　rebellious　provinces　a　second　time；　they　are　not　so　lightly

lost　afterwards；　because　the　prince；　with　little　reluctance；　takes　the

opportunity　of　the　rebellion　to　punish　the　delinquents；　to　clear　out　the

suspects；　and　to　strengthen　himself　in　the　weakest　places。　Thus　to　cause

France　to　lose　Milan　the　first　time　it　was　enough　for　the　Duke　Lodovico

to　raise　insurrections　on　the　borders；　but　to　cause　him　to　lose　it　a

second　time　it　was　necessary　to　bring　the　whole　world　against　him；　and

that　his　armies　should　be　defeated　and　driven　out　of　Italy；　which

followed　from　the　causes　above　mentioned。



Nevertheless　Milan　was　taken　from　France　both　the　first　and　the　second

time。　The　general　reasons　for　the　first　have　been　discussed；　it　remains

to　name　those　for　the　second；　and　to　see　what　resources　he　had；　and　what

any　one　in　his　situation　would　have　had　for　maintaining　himself　more

securely　in　his　acquisition　than　did　the　King　of　France。



Now　I　say　that　those　dominions　which；　when　acquired；　are　added　to　an

ancient　state　by　him　who　acquires　them；　are　either　of　the　same　country

and　language；　or　they　are　not。　When　they　are；　it　is　easier　to　hold　them；

especially　when　they　have　not　been　accustomed　to　self…government；　and　to

hold　them　securely　it　is　enough　to　have　destroyed　the　family　of　the

prince　who　was　ruling　them；　because　the　two　peoples；　preserving　in　other

things　the　old　conditions；　and　not　being　unlike　in　customs；　will　live

quietly　together；　as　one　has　seen　in　Brittany；　Burgundy；　Gascony；　and

Normandy；　which　have　been　bound　to　France　for　so　long　a　time：　and；

although　there　may　be　some　difference　in　language；　nevertheless　the

customs　are　alike；　and　the　people　will　easily　be　able　to　get　on　amongst

themselves。　He　who　has　annexed　them；　if　he　wishes　to　hold　them；　has　only

to　bear　in　mind　two　considerations：　the　one；　that　the　family　of　their

former　lord　is　extinguished；　the　other；　that　neither　their　laws　nor

their　taxes　are　altered；　so　that　in　a　very　short　time　they　will　bee

entirely　one　body　with　the　old　principality。



But　when　states　are　acquired　in　a　country　differing　in　language；

customs；　or　laws；　there　are　difficulties；　and　good　fortune　and　great

energy　are　needed　to　hold　them；　and　one　of　the　greatest　and　most　real

helps　would　be　that　he　who　has　acquired　them　should　go　and　reside　there。

This　would　make　his　position　more　secure　and　durable；　as　it　has　made

that　of　the　Turk　in　Greece；　who；　notwithstanding　all　the　other　measures

taken　by　him　for　holding　that　state；　if　he　had　not　settled　there；　would

not　have　been　able　to　keep　it。　Because；　if　one　is　on　the　spot；　disorders

are　seen　as　they　spring　up；　and　one　can　quickly　remedy　them；　but　if　one

is　not　at　hand；　they　heard　of　only　when　they　are　one　can　no　longer

remedy　them。　Besides　this；　the　country　is　not　pillaged　by　your

officials；　the　subjects　are　satisfied　by　prompt　recourse　to　the　prince；

thus；　wishing　to　be　good；　they　have　more　cause　to　love　him；　and　wishing

to　be　otherwise；　to　fear　him。　He　who　would　attack　that　state　from　the

outside　must　have　the　utmost　caution；　as　long　as　the　prince　resides

there　it　can　only　be　wrested　from　him　with　the　greatest　difficulty。



The　other　and　better　course　is　to　send　colonies　to　one　or　two　places；

which　may　be　as　keys　to　that　state；　for　it　necessary　either　to　do　this

or　else　to　keep　there　a　great　number　of　cavalry　and　infantry。　A　prince

does　not　spend　much　on　colonies；　for　with　little　or　no　expense　he　can

send　them　out　and　keep　them　there；　and　he　offends　a　minority　only　of　the

citizens　from　whom　he　takes　lands　and　houses　to　give　them　to　the　new

inhabitants；　and　those　whom　he　offends；　remaining　poor　and　scattered；

are　never　able　to　injure　him；　whilst　the　rest　being　uninjured　are　easily

kept　quiet；　and　at　the　same　time　are　anxious　not　to　err　for　fear　it

should　happen　to　them　as　it　has　to　those　who　have　been　despoiled。　In

conclusion；　I　say　that　these　colonies　are　not　costly；　they　are　more

faithful；　they　injure　less；　and　the　injured；　as　has　been　said；　being

poor　and　scattered；　cannot　hurt。　Upon　this；　one　has　to　remark　that　men

ought　either　to　be　well　treated　or　crushed；　because　they　can　avenge

themselves　of　lighter　injuries；　of　more　serious　ones　they　cannot；

therefore　the　injury　that　is　to　be　done　to　a　man　ought　to　be　of　such　a

kind　that　one　does　not　stand　in　fear　of　revenge。



But　in　maintaining　armed　men　there　in　place　of　colonies　one　spends　much

more；　having　to　consume　on　the　garrison　all　ine　from　the　state；　so

that　the　acquisition　turns　into　a　loss；　and　many　more　are　exasperated；

because　the　whole　state　is　injured；　through　the　shifting　of　the　garrison

up　and　down　all　bee　acquainted　with　hardship；　and　all　bee　hostile；

and　they　are　enemies　who；　whilst　beaten　on　their　own　ground；　are　yet

able　to　do　hurt。　For　every　reason；　therefore；　such　guards　are　as　useless

as　a　colony　is　useful。



Again；　the　prince　who　holds　a　country　differing　in　the　above　respects