bentham-第6部分
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the other half； would be to fall into his error without having his excuse。 For our own part； we have a large tolerance for one…eyed men； provided their one eye is a penetrating one： if they saw more； they probably would not see so keenly； nor so eagerly pursue one course of inquiry。 Almost all rich veins of original and striking speculation have been opened by systematic half…thinkers： though whether these new thoughts drive out others as good； or are peacefully superadded to them； depends on whether these half…thinkers are or are not followed in the same track by complete thinkers。 The field of man's nature and life cannot be too much worked； or in too many directions； until every clod is turned up the work is imperfect； no whole truth is possible but by combining the points of view of all the fractional truths； nor； therefore； until it has been fully seen what each fractional truth can do by itself。 What Bentham's fractional truths could do； there is no such good means of showing as by a review of his philosophy： and such a review； though inevitably a most brief and general one； it is now necessary to attempt。 The first question in regard to any man of speculation is； what is his theory of human life？ In the minds of many philosophers； whatever theory they have of this sort is latent； and it would be a revelation to themselves to have it pointed out to them in their writings as others can see it； unconsciously moulding everything to its own likeness。 But Bentham always knew his own premises； and made his reader know them： it was not his custom to leave the theoretic grounds of his practical conclusions to conjecture。 Few great thinkers have afforded the means of assigning with so much certainty the exact conception which they had formed of man and of man's life。 Man is conceived by Bentham as a being susceptible of pleasures and pains； and governed in all his conduct partly by the different modifications of self…interest； and the passions commonly classed as selfish； partly by sympathies； or occasionally antipathies； towards other beings。 And here Bentham's conception of human nature stops。 He does not exclude religion； the prospect of divine rewards and punishments he includes under the head of 'self…regarding interest'； and the devotional feeling under that of sympathy with God。 But the whole of the impelling or restraining principles； whether of this or of another world； which he recognizes； are either self…love； or love or hatred towards other sentient beings。 That there might be no doubt of what he thought on the subject； he has not left us to the general evidence of his writings； but has drawn out a 'Table of the Springs of Action'； an express enumeration and classification of human motives； with their various names； laudatory； vituperative； and neutral： and this table； to be found in Part I of his collected works； we recommend to the study of those who would understand his philosophy。 Man is never recognized by him as a being capable of pursuing spiritual perfection as an end； of desiring； for its own sake； the conformity of his own character to his standard of excellence； without hope of good or fear of evil from other source than his own inward consciousness。 Even in the more limited form of Conscience； this great fact in human nature escapes him。 Nothing is more curious than the absence of recognition in any of his writings of the existence of conscience； as a thing distinct from philanthropy； from affection for God or man； and from self…interest in this world or in the next。 There is a studied abstinence from any of the phrases which； in the mouths of others； import the acknowledgment of such a fact。 If we find the words 'Conscience'； 'Principle'； 'Moral Rectitude'； 'Moral Duty'； in his Table of the Springs of Action； it is among the synonymes of the 'love of reputation'。 with an intimation as to the two former phrases； that they are also sometimes synonymous with the religious motive； or the motive of sympathy。 The feeling of moral approbation or disapprobation properly so called； either towards ourselves or our fellow…creatures； he seems unaware of the existence of； and neither the word self…respect； nor the idea to which that word is appropriated； occurs even once； so far as our recollection serves us； in his whole writings。 Nor is it only the moral part of man's nature； in the strict sense of the term the desire of perfection； or the feeling of an approving or of an accusing conscience that he overlooks； he but faintly recognizes； as a fact in human nature； the pursuit of any other ideal end for its own sake。 The sense of honour； and personal dignity that feeling of personal exaltation and degradation which acts independently of other people's opinion； or even in defiance of it； the love of beauty； the passion of the artist； the love of order； of congruity； of consistency in all things； and conformity to their end； the love of power； not in the limited form of power over other human beings； but abstract power； the power of making our volitions effectual； the love of action； the thirst for movement and activity； a principle scarcely of less influence in human life than its opposite； the love of ease： None of these powerful constituents of human nature are thought worthy of a place among the 'Springs of Action'； and though there is possibly no one of them of the existence of which an acknowledgment might not be found in some corner of Bentham's writings； no conclusions are ever founded on the acknowledgment。 Man； that most complex being； is a very simple one in his eyes。 Even under the head of sympathy； his recognition does not extend to the more complex forms of the feeling the love of loving； the need of a sympathizing support； or of objects of admiration and reverence。 If he thought at all of any of the deeper feelings of human nature； it was but as idiosyncrasies of taste； with which the moralist no more than the legislator had any concern； further than to prohibit such as were mischievous among the actions to which they might chance to lead。 To say either that man should； or that he should not； take pleasure in one thing； displeasure in another； appeared to him as much an act of despotism in the moralist as in the political ruler。 It would be most unjust to Bentham to surmise （as narrow…minded and passionate adversaries are apt in such cases to do） that this picture of human nature was copied from himself； that all those constituents of humanity which he rejected from his table of motives； were wanting in his own breast。 The unusual strength of his early feelings of virtue； was； as we have seen； the original cause of all his speculations； and a noble sense of morality； and especially of justice； guides and pervades them all。 But having been early accustomed to keep before his mind's eye the happiness of mankind （or rather of the whole sentient world）； as the only thing desirable in itself； or which rendered anything else desirable； he confounded all disinterested feelings which he found in himself； with the desire of general happiness： just as some religious writers； who loved virtue for its own sake as much perhaps as men could do； habitually confounded their love of virtue with their fear of hell。 It would have required greater subtlety than Bentham possessed； to distinguish from each other； feelings which； from long habit； always acted in the same direction； and his want of imagination prevented him from reading the distinction； where it is legible enough； in the hearts of others。 Accordingly； he has not been followed in this grand oversight by any of the able men who； from the extent of their intellectual obligations to him； have been regarded as his disciples。 They may have followed him in his doctrine of utility； and in his rejection of a moral sense as the test of right and wrong： but while repudiating it as such； they have； with Hartley； acknowledged it as a fact in human nature； they have endeavoured to account for it； to assign its laws： nor are they justly chargeable either with undervaluing this part of our nature； or with any disposition to throw it into the background of their speculations。 If any part of the influence of this cardinal error has extended itself to them； it is circuitously； and through the effect on their minds of other parts of Bentham's doctrines。 Sympathy； the only disinterested motive which Bentham recognized； he felt the inadequacy of； except in certain limited cases； as a security for virtuous action。 Personal affection； he well knew； is as liable to operate to the injury of third parties； and requires as much to be kept under government； as any other feeling whatever： and general philanthropy； considered as a motive influencing mankind in general； he estimated at its true value when divorced from the feeling of duty as the very weakest and most unsteady of all feelings。 There remained； as a motive by which mankind are influenced； and by which they may be guided to their good； only personal interest。 Accordingly； Bentham's idea of the world is that of a collection of persons pursuing each his separate interest or pleasure； and the prevention of whom from jostling one another more than is unavoidable； may be attempted by hopes and fears derived fro
