bentham-第3部分
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y to prove； not for their own sakes； because they are acknowledged； but that an opening may be made for the reception of other truths which depend upon them。 It is in this manner we provide for the reception of first principles； which； once received； prepare the way for admission of all other truths。' To which may be added； that in this manner also we discipline the mind for practising the same sort of dissection upon questions more complicated and of more doubtful issue。 It is a sound maxim； and one which all close thinkers have felt； but which no one before Bentham ever so consistently applied； that error lurks in generalities： that the human mind is not capable of embracing a complex whole； until it has surveyed and catalogued the parts of which that whole is made up； that abstractions are not realities per se； but an abridged mode of expressing facts； and that the only practical mode of dealing with them is to trace them back to the facts （whether of experience or of consciousness） of which they are the expression。 Proceeding on this principle； Bentham makes short work with the ordinary modes of moral and political reasoning。 These； it appeared to him； when hunted to their source； for the most part terminated in phrases。 In politics； liberty； social order； constitution； law of nature； social compact； etc。； were the catchwords： ethics had its analogous ones。 Such were the arguments on which the gravest questions of morality and policy were made to turn； not reasons； but allusions to reasons； sacramental expressions； by which a summary appeal was made to some general sentiment of mankind； or to some maxim in familiar use； which might be true or not； but the limitations of which no one had ever critically examined。 And this satisfied other people； but not Bentham。 He required something more than opinion as a reason for opinion。 Whenever he found a phrase used as an argument for or against anything； he insisted upon knowing what it meant； whether it appealed to any standard； or gave intimation of any matter of fact relevant to the question； and if he could not find that it did either； he treated it as an attempt on the part of the disputant to impose his own individual sentiment on other people； without giving them a reason for it； a ' contrivance for avoiding the obligation of appealing to any external standard； and for prevailing upon the reader to accept of the author's sentiment and opinion as a reason； and that a sufficient one； for itself。 Bentham shall speak for himself on this subject： the passage is from his first systematic work； 'Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation'； and we could scarcely quote anything more strongly exemplifying both the strength and weakness of his mode of philosophizing。
It is curious enough to observe the variety of inventions men have hit upon； and the variety of phrases they have brought forward； in order to conceal from the world； and； if possible； from themselves； this very general and therefore very pardonable self…sufficiency。 1。 One man says； he has a thing made on purpose to tell him what is right and what is wrong； and that is called a 'moral sense'。。 and then he goes to work at his ease； and says； such a thing is right； and such a thing is wrong why？ 'Because my moral sense tells me it is。' 2。 Another man comes and alters the phrase： leaving out moral； and putting in common in the room of it。 He then tells you that his common sense tells him what is right and wrong； as surely as the other's moral sense did； meaning by common sense a sense of some kind or other； which； he says； is possessed by all mankind： the sense of those whose sense is not the same as the author's being struck out as not worth taking。 This contrivance does better than the other； for a moral sense being a new thing； a man may feel about him a good while without being able to find it out： but common sense is as old as the creation； and there is no man but would be ashamed to be thought not to have as much of it as his neighbours。 It has another great advantage： by appearing to share power； it lessens envy； for when a man gets up upon this ground； in order to anathematize those who differ from him； it is not by a sic volo sic jubeo； but by a velitis jubeatis。 3。 Another man comes； and says； that as to a moral sense indeed； he cannot find that he has any such thing： that； however； he has an understanding； which will do quite as well。 This understanding； he says； is the standard of right and wrong： it tells him so and so。 All good and wise men understand as he does： if other men's understandings differ in any part from his； so much the worse for them： it is a sure sign they are either defective or corrupt。 4。 Another man says； that there is an eternal and immutable Rule of Right： that the rule of right dictates so and so： and then he begins giving you his sentiments upon anything that comes uppermost： and these sentiments （you are to take for granted） are so many branches of the eternal rule of right。 5。 Another man； or perhaps the same man （it is nO matter）； says that there are certain practices conformable and others repugnant； to the Fitness of Things； and then he tells you； at his leisure； what practices are conformable； and what repugnant： just as he happens to like a practice or dislike it。 6。 A great multitude of people are continually talking of the Law of Nature； and then they go on giving you their sentiments about what is right and what is wrong： and these sentiments； you are to understand； are so many chapters and sections of the Law of Nature。 7。 Instead of the phrase； Law of Nature； you have sometimes Law of Reason； Right Reason； Natural Justice； Natural Equity； Good Order。 Any of them will do equally well。 This latter is most used in politics。 The three last are much more tolerable than the others； because they do not very explicitly claim to be anything more than phrases： they insist but feebly upon their being looked upon as so many positive standards of themselves； and seem content to be taken； upon occasion； for phrases expressive of the conformity of the thing in question to the proper standards； whatever that may be。 On most occasions； however； it will be better to say utility。 utility is clearer as referring more explicitly to pain and pleasure。 8。 We have one philosopher； who says； there is no harm in anything in the world but in telling a lie； and that if； for example； you were to murder your own father； this would only be a particular way of saying； he was not your father。 Of course when this philosopher sees anything that he does not like； he says； it is a particular way of telling a lie。 It is saying； that the act ought to be done； or may be done； when； in truth； it ought not be done。 9。 The fairest and openest of them all is that sort of man who speaks out； and says； I am of the number of the Elect： now God himself takes care to inform the Elect what is right： and that with so good effect； and let them strive ever so； they cannot help not only knowing it but practising it。 If therefore a man wants to know what is right and what is wrong； he has nothing to do but to come to me。
Few will contend that this is a perfectly fair representation of the animus of those who employ the various phrases so amusingly animadverted on； but that the phrases contain no argument； save what is grounded on the very feelings they are adduced to justify； is a truth which Bentham had the eminent merit of first pointing out。 It is the introduction into the philosophy of human conduct； of this method of detail of this practice of never reasoning about wholes until they have been resolved into their parts； nor about abstractions until they have been translated into realities that constitutes the originality of Bentham in philosophy； and makes him the great reformer of the moral and political branch of it。 To what he terms the 'exhaustive method of classification'； which is but one branch of this more general method； he himself ascribes everything original in the systematic and elaborate work from which we have quoted。 The generalities of his philosophy itself have little or no novelty： to ascribe any to the doctrine that general utility is the foundation of morality； would imply great ignorance of the history of philosophy； of general literature； and of Bentham's own writings。 He derived the idea； as he says himself； from Helvetius； and it was the doctrine no less； of the religious philosophers of that age； prior to Reid and Beattie。 We never saw an abler defence of the doctrine of utility than in a book written in refutation of Shaftesbury； and now little read Brown's 'Essays on the Characteristics'； and in Johnson's celebrated review of Soame Jenyns； the same doctrine is set forth as that both of the author and of the reviewer。 In all ages of philosophy one of its schools has been utilitarian not only from the time of Epicurus； but long before。 It was by mere accident that this opinion became connected in Bentham with his peculiar method。 The utilitarian philosophers antecedent to him had no more claims to the method than their antagonists。 To refer； for instance； to the Epicurean philosophy； according to the most complete view we have of the mora
