charmides-第15部分

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then　each　action　will　be　done　according　to　the　arts　or　sciences；　and　no　one



professing　to　be　a　pilot　when　he　is　not；　or　any　physician　or　general；　or



any　one　else　pretending　to　know　matters　of　which　he　is　ignorant；　will



deceive　or　elude　us；　our　health　will　be　improved；　our　safety　at　sea；　and



also　in　battle；　will　be　assured；　our　coats　and　shoes；　and　all　other



instruments　and　implements　will　be　skilfully　made；　because　the　workmen　will



be　good　and　true。　　Aye；　and　if　you　please；　you　may　suppose　that　prophecy；



which　is　the　knowledge　of　the　future；　will　be　under　the　control　of　wisdom；



and　that　she　will　deter　deceivers　and　set　up　the　true　prophets　in　their



place　as　the　revealers　of　the　future。　　Now　I　quite　agree　that　mankind；　thus



provided；　would　live　and　act　according　to　knowledge；　for　wisdom　would　watch



and　prevent　ignorance　from　intruding　on　us。　　But　whether　by　acting



according　to　knowledge　we　shall　act　well　and　be　happy；　my　dear　Critias；



this　is　a　point　which　we　have　not　yet　been　able　to　determine。







Yet　I　think；　he　replied；　that　if　you　discard　knowledge；　you　will　hardly



find　the　crown　of　happiness　in　anything　else。







But　of　what　is　this　knowledge？　I　said。　　Just　answer　me　that　small　question。　



Do　you　mean　a　knowledge　of　shoemaking？







God　forbid。







Or　of　working　in　brass？







Certainly　not。







Or　in　wool；　or　wood；　or　anything　of　that　sort？







No；　I　do　not。







Then；　I　said；　we　are　giving　up　the　doctrine　that　he　who　lives　according　to



knowledge　is　happy；　for　these　live　according　to　knowledge；　and　yet　they　are



not　allowed　by　you　to　be　happy；　but　I　think　that　you　mean　to　confine



happiness　to　particular　individuals　who　live　according　to　knowledge；　such



for　example　as　the　prophet；　who；　as　I　was　saying；　knows　the　future。　　Is　it



of　him　you　are　speaking　or　of　some　one　else？







Yes；　I　mean　him；　but　there　are　others　as　well。







Yes；　I　said；　some　one　who　knows　the　past　and　present　as　well　as　the　future；



and　is　ignorant　of　nothing。　　Let　us　suppose　that　there　is　such　a　person；



and　if　there　is；　you　will　allow　that　he　is　the　most　knowing　of　all　living



men。







Certainly　he　is。







Yet　I　should　like　to　know　one　thing　more：　　which　of　the　different　kinds　of



knowledge　makes　him　happy？　or　do　all　equally　make　him　happy？







Not　all　equally；　he　replied。







But　which　most　tends　to　make　him　happy？　the　knowledge　of　what　past；



present；　or　future　thing？　　May　I　infer　this　to　be　the　knowledge　of　the　game



of　draughts？







Nonsense　about　the　game　of　draughts。







Or　of　computation？







No。







Or　of　health？







That　is　nearer　the　truth；　he　said。







And　that　knowledge　which　is　nearest　of　all；　I　said；　is　the　knowledge　of



what？







The　knowledge　with　which　he　discerns　good　and　evil。







Monster！　I　said；　you　have　been　carrying　me　round　in　a　circle；　and　all　this



time　hiding　from　me　the　fact　that　the　life　according　to　knowledge　is　not



that　which　makes　men　act　rightly　and　be　happy；　not　even　if　knowledge



include　all　the　sciences；　but　one　science　only；　that　of　good　and　evil。　



For；　let　me　ask　you；　Critias；　whether；　if　you　take　away　this；　medicine　will



not　equally　give　health；　and　shoemaking　equally　produce　shoes；　and　the　art



of　the　weaver　clothes？whether　the　art　of　the　pilot　will　not　equally　save



our　lives　at　sea；　and　the　art　of　the　general　in　war？







Quite　so。







And　yet；　my　dear　Critias；　none　of　these　things　will　be　well　or　beneficially



done；　if　the　science　of　the　good　be　wanting。







True。







But　that　science　is　not　wisdom　or　temperance；　but　a　science　of　human



advantage；　not　a　science　of　other　sciences；　or　of　ignorance；　but　of　good



and　evil：　　and　if　this　be　of　use；　then　wisdom　or　temperance　will　not　be　of



use。







And　why；　he　replied；　will　not　wisdom　be　of　use？　　For；　however　much　we



assume　that　wisdom　is　a　science　of　sciences；　and　has　a　sway　over　other



sciences；　surely　she　will　have　this　particular　science　of　the　good　under



her　control；　and　in　this　way　will　benefit　us。







And　will　wisdom　give　health？　I　said；　is　not　this　rather　the　effect　of



medicine？　　Or　does　wisdom　do　the　work　of　any　of　the　other　arts；do　they



not　each　of　them　do　their　own　work？　　Have　we　not　long　ago　asseverated　that



wisdom　is　only　the　knowledge　of　knowledge　and　of　ignorance；　and　of　nothing



else？







That　is　obvious。







Then　wisdom　will　not　be　the　producer　of　health。







Certainly　not。







The　art　of　health　is　different。







Yes；　different。







Nor　does　wisdom　give　advantage；　my　good　friend；　for　that　again　we　have　just



now　been　attributing　to　another　art。







Very　true。







How　then　can　wisdom　be　advantageous；　when　giving　no　advantage？







That；　Socrates；　is　certainly　inconceivable。







You　see　then；　Critias；　that　I　was　not　far　wrong　in　fearing　that　I　could



have　no　sound　notion　about　wisdom；　I　was　quite　right　in　depreciating



myself；　for　that　which　is　admitted　to　be　the　best　of　all　things　would　never



have　seemed　to　us　useless；　if　I　had　been　good　for　anything　at　an　enquiry。　



But　now　I　have　been　utterly　defeated；　and　have　failed　to　discover　what　that



is　to　which　the　imposer　of　names　gave　this　name　of　temperance　or　wisdom。　



And　yet　many　more　admissions　were　made　by　us　than　could　be　fairly　granted；



for　we　admitted　that　there　was　a　science　of　science；　although　the　argument



said　No；　and　protested　against　us；　and　we　admitted　further；　that　this



science　knew　the　works　of　the　other　sciences　（although　this　too　was　denied



by　the　argument）；　because　we　wanted　to　show　that　the　wise　man　had　knowledge



of　what　he　knew　and　did　not　know；　also　we　nobly　disregarded；　and　never　even



considered；　the　impossibility　of　a　man　knowing　in　a　sort　of　way　that　which



he　does　not　know　at　all；　for　our　assumption　was；　that　he　knows　that　which



he　does　not　know；　than　which　nothing；　as　I　think；　can　be　more　irrational。　



And　yet；　after　finding　us　so　easy　and　good…natured；　the　enquiry　is　still



unable　to　discover　the　truth；　but　mocks　us　to　a　degree；　and　has　gone　out　of



its　way　to　prove　the　inutility　of　that　which　we　admitted　only　by　a　sort　of



supposition　and　fiction　to　be　the　true　definition　of　temperance　or　wisdom：　



which　result；　as　far　as　I　am　concerned；　is　not　so　much　to　be　lamented；　I



said。　　But　for　your　sake；　Charmides；　I　am　very　sorrythat　you；　having　such



beauty　and　such　wisdom　and　temperance　of　soul；　should　have　no　profit　or



good　in　life　from　your　wisdom　and　temperance。　　And　still　more　am　I　grieved



about　the　charm　which　I　learned　with　so　much　pain；　and　to　so　little　profit；



from　the　Thracian；　for　the　sake　of　a　thing　which　is　nothing　worth。　　I　think



indeed　that　there　is　a　mistake；　and　that　I　must　be　a　bad　enquirer；　for



wisdom　or　temperance　I　believe　to　be　really　a　great　good；　and　happy　are



you；　Charmides；　if　you　certainly　possess　it。　　Wherefore　examine　yourself；



and　see　whether　you　have　this　gift　and　can　do　without　the　charm；　for　if　you



can；　I　would　rather　advise　you　to　regard　me　simply　as　a　fool　who　is　never



able　to　reason　out　anything；　and　to　rest　assured　that　the　more　wise　and



temperate　you　are；　the　happier　you　will　be。







Charmides　said：　　I　am　sure　that　I　do　not　know；　Socrates；　whether　I　have　or



have　not　this　gift　of　wisdom　and　temperance；　for　how　can　I　know　whether　I



have　a　thing；　of　which　even　you　and　Critias　are；　as　you　say；　unable　to



discover　the　nature？（not　that　I　believe　you。）　　And　further；　I　am　sure；



Socrates；　that　I　do　need　the　charm；　and　as　far　as　I　am　concerned；　I　shall



be　willing　to　be　charmed　by　you　daily；　until　you　say　that　I　have　had



enough。







Very　good；　Charmides；　said　Critias；　if　you　do　this　I　shall　have　a　proof　of



your　temperance；　that　is；　if　you　allow　yourself　to　be　charmed　by　Socrates；



and　never　desert　him　at　all。







You　may　depend　on　my　following　and　not　deserting　him；　said　Charmides：　　if



you　who　are　my　guardian　command　me；　I　should　be　very　wrong　not　to　obey　you。







And　I　do　command　you；　he　said。







Then　I　will　do　as　you　say；　and　begin　this　very　day。







You　sirs；　I　said；　what　are　you　conspiring　about？







We　are　not　conspiring；　said　Charmides；　we　have　conspired　already。







And　are　you　about　to　use　violence；　without　even　going　through　the　forms　of



justice？







Yes；　I　shall　use　violence；　he　replied；　since　he　orders　me；　and　therefore



you　had　better　consider　well。







But　the　time　for　c