introduction to the metaphysic of morals-第1部分
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INTRODUCTION TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
by Immanuel Kant
translated by W。 Hastie
DIVISIONS
GENERAL DIVISIONS OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
I。 DIVISION OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS AS A SYSTEM OF
DUTIES GENERALLY。
1。 All duties are either duties of right； that is； juridical
duties （officia juris）； or duties of virtue； that is； ethical duties
（officia virtutis s。 ethica）。 Juridical duties are such as may be
promulgated by external legislation； ethical duties are those for
which such legislation is not possible。 The reason why the latter
cannot be properly made the subject of external legislation is because
they relate to an end or final purpose； which is itself； at the same
time； embraced in these duties； and which it is a duty for the
individual to have as such。 But no external legislation can cause
any one to adopt a particular intention； or to propose to himself a
certain purpose； for this depends upon an internal condition or act of
the mind itself。 However； external actions conducive to such a
mental condition may be commanded； without its being implied that
the individual will of necessity make them an end to himself。
But why； then； it may be asked； is the science of morals； or moral
philosophy； commonly entitled… especially by Cicero… the science of
duty and not also the science of right； since duties and rights
refer to each other？ The reason is this。 We know our own freedom… from
which all moral laws and consequently all rights as well as all duties
arise… only through the moral imperative； which is an immediate
injunction of duty； whereas the conception of right as a ground of
putting others under obligation has afterwards to be developed out
of it。
2。 In the doctrine of duty； man may and ought to be represented in
accordance with the nature of his faculty of freedom； which is
entirely supra…sensible。 He is； therefore； to be represented purely
according to his humanity as a personality independent of physical
determinations （homo noumenon）； in distinction from the same person as
a man modified with these determinations （homo phenomenon）。 Hence
the conceptions of right and end when referred to duty； in view of
this twofold quality； give the following division：
DIVISION OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS ACCORDING TO THE OBJECTIVE
RELATION OF THE LAW OF DUTY。
I。 The Right of Humanity。
I。 Juridical Oneself in our own person （juridicial
Duties to or duties towards oneself） Perfect
Others Duty
II。 The Right of Mankind。
in others （juridical duties
towards others。）
III。 The End of Humanity。
II。 Ethical Oneself in our person （eithical duties
Duties to or towards oneself） Imperfect
Others Duty
IV。 The End of Mankind。
in others （ethical duties
towards others。）
II。 DIVISION OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS ACCORDING TO RELATIONS
OF OBLIGATION。
As the subjects between whom a relation of right and duty is
apprehended… whether it actually exists or not… admit of being
conceived in various juridical relations to each other； another
division may be proposed from this point of view； as follows：
DIVISION POSSIBLE ACCORDING TO THE SUBJECTIVE RELATION OF
THOSE WHO BIND UNDER OBLIGATIONS； AND THOSE WHO ARE
BOUND UNDER OBLIGATIONS。
1。 The juridical relation of man to beings who have neither right
nor duty：
Vacat。 There is no such relation； for such beings are irrational；
and they neither put us under obligation； nor can we be put under
obligation by them。
2。 The juridical relation of man to beings who have both rights
and duties：
Adest。 There is such a relation； for it is the relation of men to
men。
3。 The juridical relation of man to beings who have only duties
and no rights：
Vacat。 There is no such relation； for such beings would be men
without juridical personality； as slaves of bondsmen。
4 The juridical relation of man to a being who has only rights and
no duties （God）：
Vacat。 There is no such relation in mere philosophy； because such
a being is not an object of possible experience。
A real relation between right and duty is therefore found； in this
scheme； only in No。 2。 The reason why such is not likewise found in
No。 4 is because it would constitute a transcendent duty； that is； one
to which no corresponding subject can be given that is external and
capable of imposing obligation。 Consequently the relation from the
theoretical point of view is here merely ideal； that is； it is a
relation to an object of thought which we form for ourselves。 But
the conception of this object is not entirely empty。 On the
contrary； it is a fruitful conception in relation to ourselves and the
maxims of our inner morality； and therefore in relation to practice
generally。 And it is in this bearing that all the duty involved and
practicable for us in such a merely ideal relation lies。
III。 DIVISION OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS AS A SYSTEM OF
DUTIES GENERALLY。
According to the constituent principles and the method of the
system。
I。 Principles I。 Duties of Right I。 Private Right。
II。 Public Right
II。 Duties of Virtue； etc。
And so on； including all that
refers not only to the
materials； but also to the
architectonic form of a
scientific system of morals；
when the metaphysical
investigation of the elements
has completely traced out the
universal principles constituting
the whole。
II。 Method I。 Didactics
II。 Ascetics
GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
I。 THE RELATION OF THE FACULTIES OF THE HUMAN MIND TO THE
MORAL LAWS。
The active faculty of the human mind； as the faculty of desire in
its widest sense； is the power which man has； through his mental
representations； of becoming the cause of objects corresponding to
these representations。 The capacity of a being to act in conformity
with his own representations is what constitutes the life of such a
being。
It is to be observed； first； that with desire or aversion there is
always connected pleasure or pain； the susceptibility for which is
called feeling。 But the converse does not always hold； for there may
be a pleasure connected； not with the desire of an object； but with
a mere mental representation； it being indifferent whether an object
corresponding to the representation exist or not。 And second； the
pleasure or pain connected with the object of desire does not always
precede the activity of desire； nor can it be regarded in every case
as the cause； but it may as well be the effect of that activity。 The
capacity of experiencing pleasure or pain on the occasion of a
mental representation is called 〃feeling；〃 because pleasure and pain
contain only what is subjective in the relations of our mental
activity。 They do not involve any relation to an object that could
possibly furnish a knowledge of it as such； they cannot even give us a
knowledge of our own mental state。 For even sensations；* considered
apart from the qualities which attach to them on account of the
modifications of the subject… as； for instance； in reference to red；
sweet； and such like… are referred as constituent elements of
knowledge to objects； whereas pleasure or pain felt in connection with
what is red or sweet express absolutely nothing that is in the object；
but merely a relation to the subject。 And for the reason just
stated； pleasure and pain considered in themselves cannot be more
precisely defined。 All that can be further done with regard to them is
merely to point out what consequences they may have in certain
relations； in order to make the knowledge of them available
practically。
*The sensibility as the faculty of sense may be defined by reference
to the subjective nature of our representations generally。 It is the
understanding that fir refers the subjective representations to an
object； it alone thinks anything by means of these representations。
Now； the subjective nature of our representations might be of such a
kind that they could be relat
