the writings-6-第9部分
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within the fortifications and city of Washington； shall form the
Third Army Corps； and be under his command。
3d。 The Army of Virginia shall operate in such manner as； while
protecting western Virginia and the national capital from danger or
insult； it shall in the speediest manner attack and overcome the
rebel forces under Jackson and Ewell； threaten the enemy in the
direction of Charlottesville； and render the most effective aid to
relieve General McClellan and capture Richmond。
4th。 When the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Virginia shall be
in position to communicate and directly co…operate at or before
Richmond； the chief command； while so operating together； shall be
governed； as in like cases； by the Rules and Articles of War。
A。 LINCOLN。
TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON
TO GENERAL H。 W。 HALLECK。
WAR DEPARTMENT； June 28； 1862。
MAJOR…GENERAL HALLECK：
The enemy have concentrated in such force at Richmond as to render it
absolutely necessary； in the opinion of the President； for you
immediately to detach 25；000 of your force and forward it by the
nearest and quickest route by way of Baltimore and Washington to
Richmond。 It is believed that the quickest route would be by way of
Columbus； Ky。； and up the Ohio River。 But in detaching your force
the President directs that it be done in such a way as to enable you
to hold your ground and not interfere with the movement against
Chattanooga and East Tennessee。 This condition being observed； the
forces to be detached and the routes they are to be sent are left to
your own judgment。
The direction to send these forces immediately is rendered imperative
by a serious reverse suffered by General McClellan before Richmond
yesterday； the full extent of which is not yet known。
You will acknowledge the receipt of this despatch； stating the day
and hour it is received； and inform me what your action will be； so
that we may take measures to aid in river and railroad
transportation。
EDWIN M。 STANTON； Secretary of War。
TELEGRAMS TO GENERAL A。 E。 BURNSIDE。
WASHINGTON； June 28； 1862。
GENERAL BURNSIDE：
I think you had better go； with any reinforcements you can spare； to
General McClellan。
A。 LINCOLN。
WAR DEPARTMENT； June； 28； 1862
MAJOR…GENERAL BURNSIDE； Newbern：
We have intelligence that General McClellan has been attacked in
large force and compelled to fall back toward the James River。 We
are not advised of his exact condition； but the President directs
that you shall send him all the reinforcements from your command to
the James River that you can safely do without abandoning your own
position。 Let it be infantry entirely； as he said yesterday that he
had cavalry enough。
EDWIN M。 STANTON；
Secretary of War。
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G。 B。 McCLELLAN。
WAR DEPARTMENT； WASHINGTON CITY； June 28； 1862。
MAJOR…GENERAL McCLELLAN：
Save your army； at all events。 Will send reinforcements as fast as
we can。 Of course they cannot reach you to…day； to…morrow； or next
day。 I have not said you were ungenerous for saying you needed
reinforcements。 I thought you were ungenerous in assuming that I did
not send them as fast as I could。 I feel any misfortune to you and
your army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself。 If you have had a
drawn battle； or a repulse； it is the price we pay for the enemy not
being in Washington。 We protected Washington； and the enemy
concentrated on you。 Had we stripped Washington； he would have been
upon us before the troops could have gotten to you。 Less than a week
ago you notified us that reinforcements were leaving Richmond to come
in front of us。 It is the nature of the case； and neither you nor
the government is to blame。 Please tell at once the present
condition and aspect of things。
A。 LINCOLN
TO SECRETARY SEWARD。
EXECUTIVE MANSION； June 28； 1862
HON。 W。 H。 SEWARD。
MY DEAR SIR：My view of the present condition of the war is about as
follows：
The evacuation of Corinth and our delay by the flood in the
Chickahominy have enabled the enemy to concentrate too much force in
Richmond for McClellan to successfully attack。 In fact there soon
will be no substantial rebel force anywhere else。 But if we send all
the force from here to McClellan； the enemy will； before we can know
of it； send a force from Richmond and take Washington。 Or if a large
part of the western army be brought here to McClellan； they will let
us have Richmond； and retake Tennessee； Kentucky； Missouri； etc。
What should be done is to hold what we have in the West； open the
Mississippi； and take Chattanooga and East Tennessee without more。 A
reasonable force should in every event be kept about Washington for
its protection。 Then let the country give us a hundred thousand new
troops in the shortest possible time； which； added to McClellan
directly or indirectly； will take Richmond without endangering any
other place which we now hold； and will substantially end the war。 I
expect to maintain this contest until successful； or till I die； or
am conquered； or my term expires； or Congress or the country forsake
me； and I would publicly appeal to the country for this new force
were it not that I fear a general panic and stampede would follow； so
hard it is to have a thing understood as it really is。 I think the
new force should be all； or nearly all； infantry； principally because
such can be raised most cheaply and quickly。
Yours very truly；
A。 LINCOLN。
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J。 A。 DIX。
WAR DEPARTMENT； WASHINGTON； D。C。； June 28；1862。
GENERAL DIX：
Communication with McClellan by White House is cut off。 Strain every
nerve to open communication with him by James River； or any other way
you can。 Report to me。
A。 LINCOLN。
TELEGRAM TO FLAG…OFFICER L。 M。 GOLDSBOROUGH。
WASHINGTON； D。C。； June 28； 1862。
FLAG…OFFICER GOLDS BOROUGH； Fort Monroe：
Enemy has cut McClellan's communication with White House； and is
driving Stoneman back on that point。 Do what you can for him with
gunboats at or near that place。 McClellan's main force is between
the Chickahominy and the James。 Also do what you can to communicate
with him and support him there。
A。 LINCOLN
To GOVERNOR MORTON。
WAR DEPARTMENT； WASHINGTON； D。C。
June 28； 1862。
GOVERNOR O。 P。 MORTON； Indianapolis； Ind：
Your despatch of to…day is just received。 I have no recollection of
either John R。 Cravens or Cyrus M。 Allen having been named to me for
appointment under the tax law。 The latter particularly has been my
friend； and I am sorry to learn that he is not yours。 No appointment
has been or will be made by me for the purpose of stabbing you。
A。 LINCOLN。
TELEGRAM TO SECRETARY SEWARD。
WAR DEPARTMENT； June 29； 1862。6 P。M。
HON。 WILLIAM H。 SEWARD； Astor House； New York：
Not much more than when you left。 Fulton of Baltimore American is
now with us。 He left White House at 11 A。M。 yesterday。 He
conversed fully with a paymaster who was with Porter's force during
the fight of Friday and fell back to nearer McClellan's quarters just
a little sooner than Porter did； seeing the whole of it； stayed on
the Richmond side of the Chickahominy over night； and left for White
House at 5 A。M。 Saturday。 He says Porter retired in perfect order
under protection of the guns arranged for the purpose； under orders
and not from necessity； and with all other of our forces； except what
was left on purpose to go to White House； was safely in pontoons over
the Chickahominy before morning； and that there was heavy firing on
the Richmond side； begun at 5 and ceased at 7 A。M。 Saturday。 On the
whole； I think we have had the better of it up to that point of time。
What has happened since we still know not； as we have no
communication with General McClellan。 A despatch from Colonel
Ingalls shows that he thinks McClellan is fighting with the enemy at
Richmond to…day； and will be to…morrow。 We have no means of knowing
upon what Colonel Ingalls founds his opinion。 Confirmed about saving
all property。 Not a single unwounded straggler came back to White
House from the field； and the number of wounded reaching there up to
11 A。M。 Saturday was not large。
A。 LINCOLN。
To what the President has above stated I will only add one or two
points that may be satisfactory for you to know。
First。 All the sick and wounded were safely removed
Second。 A despatch from Burnside shows that he is from White House；
not a man left behind in condition to afford efficient support； and
is probably doing so。
Third。 The despatch from Colonel Ingalls impresses me with the
conviction that the movement was made by General McClellan to
concen
