essays on life, art and science-第26部分

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her　away；　and　as　such　she　accepts　it。　　Granted　that　the　symbols　in
use　among　the　lower　animals　are　fewer　and　less　highly　differentiated
than　in　the　case　of　any　known　human　language；　and　therefore　that
animal　language　is　incomparably　less　subtle　and　less　capable　of
expressing　delicate　shades　of　meaning　than　our　own；　these
differences　are　nevertheless　only　those　that　exist　between　highly
developed　and　inchoate　language；　they　do　not　involve　those　that
distinguish　language　from　no　language。　　They　are　the　differences
between　the　undifferentiated　protoplasm　of　the　amoeba　and　our　own
complex　organisation；　they　are　not　the　differences　between　life　and
no　life。　　In　animal　language　as　much　as　in　human　there　is　a　mind
intentionally　making　use　of　a　symbol　accepted　by　another　mind　as
invariably　attached　to　a　certain　idea；　in　order　to　produce　that　idea
in　the　mind　which　it　is　desired　to　affectmore　briefly；　there　is　a
sayer；　a　sayee；　and　a　covenanted　symbol　designedly　applied。　　Our　own
speech　is　vertebrated　and　articulated　by　means　of　nouns；　verbs；　and
the　rules　of　grammar。　　A　dog's　speech　is　invertebrate；　but　I　do　not
see　how　it　is　possible　to　deny　that　it　possesses　all　the　essential
elements　of　language。

I　have　said　nothing　about　Professor　R。　L。　Garner's　researches　into
the　language　of　apes；　because　they　have　not　yet　been　so　far　verified
and　accepted　as　to　make　it　safe　to　rely　upon　them；　but　when　he　lays
it　down　that　all　voluntary　sounds　are　the　products　of　thought；　and
that；　if　they　convey　a　meaning　to　another；　they　perform　the
functions　of　human　speech；　he　says　what　I　believe　will　commend
itself　to　any　unsophisticated　mind。　　I　could　have　wished；　however；
that　he　had　not　limited　himself　to　sounds；　and　should　have　preferred
his　saying　what　I　doubt　not　he　would　readily　acceptI　mean；　that
all　symbols　or　tokens　of　whatever　kind；　if　voluntarily　adopted　as
such；　are　the　products　of　thought；　and　perform　the　functions　of
human　speech；　but　I　cannot　too　often　remind　you　that　nothing　can　be
considered　as　fulfilling　the　conditions　of　language；　except　a
voluntary　application　of　a　recognised　token　in　order　to　convey　a
more　or　less　definite　meaning；　with　the　intention　doubtless　of　thus
purchasing　as　it　were　some　other　desired　meaning　and　consequent
sensation。　　It　is　astonishing　how　closely　in　this　respect　money　and
words　resemble　one　another。　　Money　indeed　may　be　considered　as　the
most　universal　and　expressive　of　all　languages。　　For　gold　and　silver
coins　are　no　more　money　when　not　in　the　actual　process　of　being
voluntarily　used　in　purchase；　than　words　not　so　in　use　are　language。
Pounds；　shillings　and　pence　are　recognised　covenanted　tokens；　the
outward　and　visible　signs　of　an　inward　and　spiritual　purchasing
power；　but　till　in　actual　use　they　are　only　potential　money；　as　the
symbols　of　language；　whatever　they　may　be；　are　only　potential
language　till　they　are　passing　between　two　minds。　　It　is　the　power
and　will　to　apply　the　symbols　that　alone　gives　life　to　money；　and　as
long　as　these　are　in　abeyance　the　money　is　in　abeyance　also；　the
coins　may　be　safe　in　one's　pocket；　but　they　are　as　dead　as　a　log
till　they　begin　to　burn　in　it；　and　so　are　our　words　till　they　begin
to　burn　within　us。

The　real　question；　however；　as　to　the　substantial　underlying
identity　between　the　language　of　the　lower　animals　and　our　own；
turns　upon　that　other　question　whether　or　no；　in　spite　of　an
immeasurable　difference　of　degree；　the　thought　and　reason　of　man　and
of　the　lower　animals　is　essentially　the　same。　　No　one　will　expect　a
dog　to　master　and　express　the　varied　ideas　that　are　incessantly
arising　in　connection　with　human　affairs。　　He　is　a　pauper　as　against
a　millionaire。　　To　ask　him　to　do　so　would　be　like　giving　a　street…
boy　sixpence　and　telling　him　to　go　and　buy　himself　a　founder's　share
in　the　New　River　Company。　　He　would　not　even　know　what　was　meant；
and　even　if　he　did　it　would　take　several　millions　of　sixpences　to
buy　one。　　It　is　astonishing　what　a　clever　workman　will　do　with　very
modest　tools；　or　again　how　far　a　thrifty　housewife　will　make　a　very
small　sum　of　money　go；　or　again　in　like　manner　how　many　ideas　an
intelligent　brute　can　receive　and　convey　with　its　very　limited
vocabulary；　but　no　one　will　pretend　that　a　dog's　intelligence　can
ever　reach　the　level　of　a　man's。　　What　we　do　maintain　is　that；
within　its　own　limited　range；　it　is　of　the　same　essential　character
as　our　own；　and　that　though　a　dog's　ideas　in　respect　of　human
affairs　are　both　vague　and　narrow；　yet　in　respect　of　canine　affairs
they　are　precise　enough　and　extensive　enough　to　deserve　no　other
name　than　thought　or　reason。　　We　hold　moreover　that　they　communicate
their　ideas　in　essentially　the　same　manner　as　we　dothat　is　to　say；
by　the　instrumentality　of　a　code　of　symbols　attached　to　certain
states　of　mind　and　material　objects；　in　the　first　instance
arbitrarily；　but　so　persistently；　that　the　presentation　of　the
symbol　immediately　carries　with　it　the　idea　which　it　is　intended　to
convey。　　Animals　can　thus　receive　and　impart　ideas　on　all　that　most
concerns　them。　　As　my　great　namesake　said　some　two　hundred　years
ago；　they　know　〃what's　what；　and　that's　as　high　as　metaphysic　wit
can　fly。〃　　And　they　not　only　know　what's　what　themselves；　but　can
impart　to　one　another　any　new　what's…whatness　that　they　may　have
acquired；　for　they　are　notoriously　able　to　instruct　and　correct　one
another。

Against　this　Professor　Max　Muller　contends　that　we　can　know　nothing
of　what　goes　on　in　the　mind　of　any　lower　animal；　inasmuch　as　we　are
not　lower　animals　ourselves。　　〃We　can　imagine　anything　we　like　about
what　passes　in　the　mind　of　an　animal；〃　he　writes；　〃we　can　know
absolutely　nothing。〃　｛19｝　　It　is　something　to　have　it　in　evidence
that　he　conceives　animals　as　having　a　mind　at　all；　but　it　is　not
easy　to　see　how　they　can　be　supposed　to　have　a　mind；　without　being
able　to　acquire　ideas；　and　having　acquired；　to　read；　mark；　learn；
and　inwardly　digest　them。　　Surely　the　mistake　of　requiring　too　much
evidence　is　hardly　less　great　than　that　of　being　contented　with　too
little。　　We；　too；　are　animals；　and　can　no　more　refuse　to　infer
reason　from　certain　visible　actions　in　their　case　than　we　can　in　our
own。　　If　Professor　Max　Muller's　plea　were　allowed；　we　should　have　to
deny　our　right　to　infer　confidently　what　passes　in　the　mind　of　any
one　not　ourselves；　inasmuch　as　we　are　not　that　person。　　We　never；
indeed；　can　obtain　irrefragable　certainty　about　this　or　any　other
matter；　but　we　can　be　sure　enough　in　many　cases　to　warrant　our
staking　all　that　is　most　precious　to　us　on　the　soundness　of　our
opinion。　　Moreover；　if　the　Professor　denies　our　right　to　infer　that
animals　reason；　on　the　ground　that　we　are　not　animals　enough
ourselves　to　be　able　to　form　an　opinion；　with　what　right　does　he
infer　so　confidently　himself　that　they　do　not　reason？　　And　how；　if
they　present　every　one　of　those　appearances　which　we　are　accustomed
to　connect　with　the　communication　of　an　idea　from　one　mind　to
another；　can　we　deny　that　they　have　a　language　of　their　own；　though
it　is　one　which　in　most　cases　we　can　neither　speak　nor　understand？
How　can　we　say　that　a　sentinel　rook；　when　it　sees　a　man　with　a　gun
and　warns　the　other　rooks　by　a　concerted　note　which　they　all　show
that　they　understand　by　immediately　taking　flight；　should　not　be
credited　both　with　reason　and　the　germs　of　language？

After　all；　a　professor；　whether　of　philology；　psychology；　biology；
or　any　other　ology；　is　hardly　the　kind　of　person　to　whom　we　should
appeal　on　such　an　elementary　question　as　that　of　animal　intelligence
and　language。　　We　might　as　well　ask　a　botanist　to　tell　us　whether
grass　grows；　or　a　meteorologist　to　tell　us　if　it　has　left　off
raining。　　If　it　is　necessary　to　appeal　to　any　one；　I　should　prefer
the　opinion　of　an　intelligent　gamekeeper　to　that　of　any　professor；
however　learned。　　The　keepers；　again；　at　the　Zoological　Gardens；
have　exceptional　opportunities　for　studying　the　minds　of　animals
modified；　indeed；　by　captivity；　but　still　minds　of　animals。　　Grooms；
again；　and　dog…fanciers；　are　to　the　full　as　able　to　form　an
intelligent　opinion　on　the　reason　and　language　of　animals　as　any
University　Professor；　and　so　are　cats'…meat　men。　　I　have　repeatedly
asked　gamekeepers　and　keepers　at　the　Zoological　Gardens　whether
animals　could　reason　and　converse　with　one　another；　and　have　always
found　myself　regarded　somewhat　contemptuously　for　having　even　asked
the　question。　　I　once　said　to　a　friend；　in　the　hearing　of　a　keeper
at　the　Zoological　Gardens；　that　the　penguin　was　very　stupid。　　The
man　was　furious；　and　jumped　upon　me　at　once。　　〃He's　not　stupid　at
all；〃　said　he；　〃he's　very　intelligent。〃

Who　has　not　seen　a　cat；　when　it　wishes　to　go　out；　raise　its　fore
paws　on　to　the　handle　of　the　door；　or　as　near　as　it　can　get；　and
look　round；　evidently　asking　some　one　to　turn　it　for　her？　　Is　it
reasonable　to　deny　that　a　reasoning　process　is　going　on　in　the　cat's
mind；　whereby　she　connects　her　wish　with　the　steps　necessary　for　its
fulfilment；　and　also　with　certain　invariable　symbols　which　she　knows
her　master　or　mistress　will　interpret？　　Once；　in　company　with　a
friend；　I　watched　a　cat　playing　with　a　hou