wealbk05-第37部分

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corporate　in　the　kingdom；　and　arises　almost　altogether；　either

from　the　rent　of　houses；　or　from　what　is　supposed　to　be　the

interest　of　trading　and　capital　stock。　According　to　the

estimation；　therefore；　by　which　Great　Britain　is　rated　to　the

land…tax；　the　whole　mass　of　revenue　arising　from　the　rent　of　all

the　lands；　from　that　of　all　the　houses；　and　from　the　interest　of

all　the　capital　stock；　that　part　of　it　only　excepted　which　is

either　lent　to　the　public；　or　employed　in　the　cultivation　of

land；　does　not　exceed　ten　millions　sterling　a　year；　the　ordinary

revenue　which　government　levies　upon　the　people　even　in　peaceable

times。　The　estimation　by　which　Great　Britain　is　rated　to　the

land…tax　is；　no　doubt；　taking　the　whole　kingdom　at　an　average；

very　much　below　the　real　value；　though　in　several　particular

counties　and　districts　it　is　said　to　be　nearly　equal　to　that

value。　The　rent　of　the　lands　alone；　exclusively　of　that　of

houses；　and　of　the　interest　of　stock；　has　by　many　people　been

estimated　at　twenty　millions；　an　estimation　made　in　a　great

measure　at　random；　and　which；　I　apprehend；　is　as　likely　to　be

above　as　below　the　truth。　But　if　the　lands　of　Great　Britain；　in

the　present　state　of　their　cultivation；　do　not　afford　a　rent　of

more　than　twenty　millions　a　year；　they　could　not　well　afford　the

half；　most　probably　not　the　fourth　part　of　that　rent；　if　they　all

belonged　to　a　single　proprietor；　and　were　put　under　the

negligent；　expensive；　and　oppressive　management　of　his　factors

and　agents。　The　crown　lands　of　Great　Britain　do　not　at　present

afford　the　fourth　part　of　the　rent　which　could　probably　be　drawn

from　them　if　they　were　the　property　of　private　persons。　If　the

crown　lands　were　more　extensive；　it　is　probable　they　would　be

still　worse　managed。

　　　　　The　revenue　which　the　great　body　of　the　people　derives　from

land　is　in　proportion；　not　to　the　rent；　but　to　the　produce　of　the

land。　The　whole　annual　produce　of　the　land　of　every　country；　if

we　except　what　is　reserved　for　seed；　is　either　annually　consumed

by　the　great　body　of　the　people；　or　exchanged　for　something　else

that　is　consumed　by　them。　Whatever　keeps　down　the　produce　of　the

land　below　what　it　would　otherwise　rise　to　keeps　down　the　revenue

of　the　great　body　of　the　people　still　more　than　it　does　that　of

the　proprietors　of　land。　The　rent　of　land；　that　portion　of　the

produce　which　belongs　to　the　proprietors；　is　scarce　anywhere　in

Great　Britain　supposed　to　be　more　than　a　third　part　of　the　whole

produce。　If　the　land　which　in　one　state　of　cultivation　affords　a

rent　of　ten　millions　sterling　a　year　would　in　another　afford　a

rent　of　twenty　millions；　the　rent　being；　in　both　cases；　supposed

a　third　part　of　the　produce；　the　revenue　of　the　proprietors　would

be　less　than　it　otherwise　might　be　by　ten　millions　a　year　only；

but　the　revenue　of　the　great　body　of　the　people　would　be　less

than　it　otherwise　might　be　by　thirty　millions　a　year；　deducting

only　what　would　be　necessary　for　seed。　The　population　of　the

country　would　be　less　by　the　number　of　people　which　thirty

millions　a　year；　deducting　always　the　seed；　could　maintain

according　to　the　particular　mode　of　living　and　expense　which

might　take　place　in　the　different　ranks　of　men　among　whom　the

remainder　was　distributed。

　　　　　Though　there　is　not　at　present；　in　Europe；　any　civilised

state　of　any　kind　which　derives　the　greater　part　of　its　public

revenue　from　the　rent　of　lands　which　are　the　property　of　the

state；　yet　in　all　the　great　monarchies　of　Europe　there　are　still

many　large　tracts　of　land　which　belong　to　the　crown。　They　are

generally　forest；　and　sometimes　forest　where；　after　travelling

several　miles；　you　will　scarce　find　a　single　tree；　a　mere　waste

and　loss　of　country　in　respect　both　of　produce　and　population。　In

every　great　monarchy　of　Europe　the　sale　of　the　crown　lands　would

produce　a　very　large　sum　of　money；　which；　if　applied　to　the

payment　of　the　public　debts；　would　deliver　from　mortgage　a　much

greater　revenue　than　any　which　those　lands　have　ever　afforded　to

the　crown。　In　countries　where　lands；　improved　and　cultivated　very

highly；　and　yielding　at　the　time　of　sale　as　great　a　rent　as　can

easily　be　got　from　them；　commonly　sell　at　thirty　years'　purchase；

the　unimproved；　uncultivated；　and　low…rented　crown　lands　might

well　be　expected　to　sell　at　forty；　fifty；　or　sixty　years'

purchase。　The　crown　might　immediately　enjoy　the　revenue　which

this　great　price　would　redeem　from　mortgage。　In　the　course　of　a

few　years　it　would　probably　enjoy　another　revenue。　When　the　crown

lands　had　become　private　property；　they　would；　in　the　course　of　a

few　years；　become　well　improved　and　well　cultivated。　The　increase

of　their　produce　would　increase　the　population　of　the　country　by

augmenting　the　revenue　and　consumption　of　the　people。　But　the

revenue　which　the　crown　derives　from　the　duties　of　customs　and

excise　would　necessarily　increase　with　the　revenue　and

consumption　of　the　people。

　　　　　The　revenue　which；　in　any　civilised　monarchy；　the　crown

derives　from　the　crown　lands；　though　it　appears　to　cost　nothing

to　individuals；　in　reality　costs　more　to　the　society　than　perhaps

any　other　equal　revenue　which　the　crown　enjoys。　It　would；　in　all

cases；　be　for　the　interest　of　the　society　to　replace　this　revenue

to　the　crown　by　some　other　equal　revenue；　and　to　divide　the　lands

among　the　people；　which　could　not　well　be　done　better；　perhaps；

than　by　exposing　them　to　public　sale。

　　　　　Lands　for　the　purposes　of　pleasure　and　magnificence…　parks；

gardens；　public　walks；　etc。；　possessions　which　are　everywhere

considered　as　causes　of　expense；　not　as　sources　of　revenue…　seem

to　be　the　only　lands　which；　in　a　great　and　civilised　monarchy；

ought　to　belong　to　the　crown。

　　　　　Public　stock　and　public　lands；　therefore；　the　two　sources　of

revenue　which　may　peculiarly　belong　to　the　sovereign　or

commonwealth；　being　both　improper　and　insufficient　funds　for

defraying　the　necessary　expense　of　any　great　and　civilised　state；

it　remains　that　this　expense　must；　the　greater　part　of　it；　be

defrayed　by　taxes　of　one　kind　or　another；　the　people　contributing

a　part　of　their　own　private　revenue　in　order　to　make　up　a　public

revenue　to　the　sovereign　or　commonwealth。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PART　2

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　Taxes　

　　　　　THE　private　revenue　of　individuals；　it　has　been　shown　in　the

first　book　of　this　Inquiry；　arises　ultimately　from　three

different　sources：　Rent；　Profit；　and　Wages。　Every　tax　must

finally　be　paid　from　some　one　or　other　of　those　three　different

sorts　of　revenue；　or　from　all　of　them　indifferently。　I　shall

endeavour　to　give　the　best　account　I　can；　first；　of　those　taxes

which；　it　is　intended；　should　fall　upon　rent；　secondly；　of　those

which；　it　is　intended；　should　fall　upon　profit；　thirdly；　of　those

which；　it　is　intended；　should　fall　upon　wages；　and；　fourthly；　of

those　which；　it　is　intended；　should　fall　indifferently　upon　all

those　three　different　sources　of　private　revenue。　The　particular

consideration　of　each　of　these　four　different　sorts　of　taxes　will

divide　the　second　part　of　the　present　chapter　into　four　articles；

three　of　which　will　require　several　other　subdivisions。　Many　of

those　taxes；　it　will　appear　from　the　following　review；　are　not

finally　paid　from　the　fund；　or　source　of　revenue；　upon　which　it

was　intended　they　should　fall。

　　　　　Before　I　enter　upon　the　examination　of　particular　taxes；　it

is　necessary　to　premise　the　four　following　maxims　with　regard　to

taxes　in　general。

　　　　　I。　The　subjects　of　every　state　ought　to　contribute　towards

the　support　of　the　government；　as　nearly　as　possible；　in

proportion　to　their　respective　abilities；　that　is；　in　proportion

to　the　revenue　which　they　respectively　enjoy　under　the　protection

of　the　state。　The　expense　of　government　to　the　individuals　of　a

great　nation　is　like　the　expense　of　management　to　the　joint

tenants　of　a　great　estate；　who　are　all　obliged　to　contribute　in

proportion　to　their　respective　interests　in　the　estate。　In　the

observation　or　neglect　of　this　maxim　consists　what　is　called　the

equality　or　inequality　of　taxation。　Every　tax；　it　must　be

observed　once　for　all；　which　falls　finally　upon　one　only　of　the

three　sorts　of　revenue　above　mentioned；　is　necessarily　unequal　in

so　far　as　it　does　not　affect　the　other　two。　In　the　following

examination　of　different　taxes　I　shall　seldom　take　much　further

notice　of　this　sort　of　inequality；　but　shall；　in　most　cases；

confine　my　observations　to　that　inequality　which　is　occasioned　by

a　particular　tax　falling　unequally　even　upon　that　particular　sort

of　private　revenue　which　is　affected　by　it。

　　　　　II。　The　tax　which　each　individual　is　bound　to　pay　ought　to

be　certain；　and　not　arbitrary。　The　time　of　payment；　the　manner　of

payment；　the　quantity　to　be　paid；　ought　all　to　be　clear　and　plain

to　the　contributor；　and　to　every　other　person。　Where　it　is

otherwise；　every　person　subject　to　the　tax　is