cyprus, as i saw it in 1879-第85部分

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of　modern　improvements　that　the　cumbrous　and　complicated　ironclads
cannot　be　repaired　in　a　few　days　after　an　action　with　the　enemy　by　their
own　carpenters　and　crews；　like　the　wooden　vessels　of　old；　but　that　docks
must　be　within　reach；　and　all　the　appliances　of　the　engineers'　yards　and
an　arsenal。　Without　this　advantage；　Famagousta　would　be　a　useless
acquisition；　and　Cyprus　would　be　worthless　as　a　strategical　position。

In　my　opinion　the　entire　question　hangs　upon　the　integrity　of　Turkey　as
an　ally。　England　has　done　but　little　for　her；　and　we　may　expect　too
much。　The　Turks　are　thoroughly　aware　that　an　Anglo…Turkish　defensive
alliance；　and　the　〃Protectorate　of　Asia　Minor　by　Great　Britain；〃　are
political　arrangements　based　upon　self…interest；　for　which　they　owe　us
no　personal　gratitude；　in　the　hour　of　their　distress　we　declined
material　assistance；　but　seized　the　opportunity　for　occupying　one　of
their　important　positionsCyprus；　their　only　satisfaction　remained　in
the　knowledge　that　they　had　〃done　us〃　in　the　bargain。　We　have　quickly
discovered　the　painful　fact；　and　one　party　to　the　alliance　already　feels
aggrieved；　and　seeks　for　an　alteration　in　the　terms　of　the　Convention。

I　cannot　conceive　any　more　dangerous　risk　to　friendships　than　an
interference　in　the　private　affairs　of　individuals；　or　in　the　public
administration　of　governments。　We　have　assumed　the　enormous
responsibility　of　the　Protectorate　of　Asia　Minor　under　conditions　which
we　must　know　will　never　be　fulfilled；　Turkey　promises　to　reform　the
abuses　of　her　internal　administration；　&c。　&c。！　Anybody　who　knows　Turkey
must　be　aware　that　such　a　reform　is　impossible：　the　honest
administrative　material　does　not　exist　in　the　Ottoman　Empire；　and　the
promises　of　the　Porte　have　been　tolerably　exemplified　since　the　Crimean
war。　Under　these　circumstances　the　Anglo…Turkish　alliance　is　in　a
questionable　position。　We　have　assumed　the　Protectorate　of　Asia　Minor
conditionally；　we　occupy　Cyprus　conditionally；　and　should　Turkey　fail　to
perform　her　promises　in　the　government　of　her　Asiatic　provinces；　we　have
a　back…door　for　an　escape　from　our　onerous　engagement。　Unfortunately
English　diplomacy　is　celebrated　for　back…doors。　In　the　Berlin　Treaty　we
entered　Cyprus　through　a　back…door；　and　we　may　possibly　retire　by　the
same　exit；　but　there　is　little　doubt　that　the　Turk　does　not　believe　in
our　professed　determination　to　defend　him　by　force　of　arms　in　the　event
of　a　future　conflict　between　Russia　and　the　Sultan　in　Asia　Minor。
Notwithstanding　our　professed　sincerity；　the　Turk　has　become　an
unbeliever　in　the　faith　of　treaties　and　political　engagements；　he
believes　most　thoroughly　that　should　〃British　interests〃　require　the
sacrifice　of　honour；　England　will　somehow　or　other　manage　to　slip
through　the　Ottoman　fingers；　and　escape　from　her　alliance　when　called
upon　to　meet　Russia　in　the　field。　Of　course　the　ignorant　Turk　is　wrong；
and　his　suspicions　are　unfounded。

With　a　mutual　want　of　confidence　in　the　integrity　of　an　alliance；　it
would　hardly　be　surprising　should　the　Sultan　attach　more　importance　to
the　practical　force　of　Russia　than　to　the　moral　rectitude　and　high
political　principles　of　England。　The　power　of　Russia　has　been　felt；　and
the　position　of　European　Turkey　is　that　of　a　dislocated　and　dismembered
Empire；　which　upon　the　next　explosion　will　reduce　the　Sultan　to　the
small　extremity　on　the　Bosphorus　between　Constantinople　and　the　lines　of
Tchataldja。　Turkey　will　cease　to　be　a　European　Power；　and　upon　the
outbreak　of　the　next　Russian　war　she　will　be　discovered　as　represented
by　Asia　Minor；　in　which　the　claws　of　the　Eagle　are　already　fixed　in　the
vital　pointsBatoum；　Kars；　and　Ardahan。　A　Russian　advance　from　those
positions　will；　according　to　the　terms　of　the　alliance；　compel　Great
Britain　to　exhibit　herself　as　the　champion　of　Turkish　rights　in　armed
defence　of　Asia　Minor。

When　we　reflect　upon　the　prodigious　responsibility　of　such　an　alliance
with　a　crippled　Power　that　has　been　completely　subdued；　the　victorious
army　of　the　Czar　retired　from　the　gates　of　the　capital；　the　nation
bankrupt　beyond　all　hopes　of　liquidation；　the　various　states　in　chronic
discontent　both　in　Europe　and　in　Asia；　and　the　claims　of　Greece
threatening　to　explode　the　combustible　materials；　we　may　well　appreciate
the　back…door　that　has　so　frequently　afforded　a　retreat　from　an
untenable　position。

If　it　is　necessary　for　England　to　form　a　defensive　alliance　with　Turkey
as　a　crippled　Power；　with　Russia　actually　established　in　Asia　Minor；　why
should　we　have　waited　until　Turkey　was　mortally　stricken；　when　by　an
earlier　alliance　we　could　have　at　least　saved　Asia　Minor　in　its
integrity？　We　have　let　the　lion　into　the　house　with　a　boast　that　we　will
turn　him　out　in　the　event　of　further　roaring；　instead　of　having
prevented　his　entry　in　the　first　instance。

Under　all　the　circumstances　of　the　risk　and　responsibility　assumed　by
England　in　a　defensive　alliance　with　Turkey　under　the　title　of　a
Protectorate　of　Asia　Minor；　the　Cyprus　Convention　is　highly　unfavourable
in　its　conditions。　The　island　should　have　been　simply　conveyed　from
Turkey　and　transferred　as　a　free　gift　to　England；　as　a　position
necessary　for　her　occupation　under　the　probable　contingencies　of　the
Anglo…Turkish　alliance；　and　it　should　have　at　once　become　a　portion　of
the　British　Empire。　Had　this　course　been　pursued　a　mutual　confidence
would　have　been　established；　on　the　other　hand；　all　back…doors　would
have　been　sealed；　as　we　should　have　been　bound　by　all　the　laws　of　honour
to　defend　Turkey　to　the　last　extremity　in　Asia　Minor。

Russia；　in　Kars；　occupies　a　position　which　affords　an　unbounded　horizon
for　political　intrigue。　The　various　Turkish　Pachas　and　other　district
authorities　throughout　Asia　Minor　have　witnessed　the　irresistible
advance　of　Russia；　while　England　stood　afar　off；　and　only　assisted
Turkey　with　her　good　counsel。　The　same　authorities　now　see　Russia　in
possession；　while　England；　who　has　not　assisted　during　the　bloody
struggle；　appears　upon　the　scene　as　a　political　Paul　Pry；　and　intrudes
upon　the　mysteries　that　surround　Pachas；　Governors；　and　various
functionaries；　who；　from　the　highest　to　the　lowest　official；　mainly
exist　upon　extortion。

It　is　hardly　necessary　to　explain　that　British　assistance　in　such　a　form
will　be　most　unwelcome；　and　will　increase　our　reputation　for
intermeddling　while　in　the　hour　of　extremity　we　withhold　the　required
aid。　Any　interference　on　our　part　with　the　administration　of　Asia　Minor
will　cause　an　extreme　jealousy　and　suspicion　throughout　all　classes　of
Turkish　officials；　who　will　be　rendered　the　more　amenable　to　the　guiles
of　Russian　intrigues　from　Kars　and　Ardahan。　A　very　slight　knowledge　of
Turkish　character　would　induce　the　natural　conclusion。　The　English　would
be　suspected　of　coveting　Asia　Minor；　as　they　had　already　obtained
Cyprus；　and　Russia　would　have　gained　her　end　in　destroying　all
confidence　that　might　possibly　have　existed；　and　thus　endanger　the
defensive　alliance。

There　are　serious　risks　that　might　enforce　the　advance　of　Russian　troops
beyond　the　defined　frontier。　Already　there　are　reports　of　general
discontent　and　threatened　disturbances。　In　the　event　of　a　mutiny　of
Turkish　troops　on　the　Russian　border；　the　Russians　might　be　invited　to
assist　by　the　Pacha　in　command。　Sometimes　such　revolts　are　factitious；
for　political　purposes。　In　all　cases　the　position　of　Russia　in　Asia
Minor　is　one　of　extreme　danger　to　Turkey；　and　it　is　far　from　improbable
that　activity　on　her　side；　and　passiveness　upon　ours；　may　terminate　in　a
friendship　between　the　Russians　and　the　Turks　to　the　detriment　of
British　interests；　and　to　the　confusion　of　the　assumed　Protectorate。
This　document　distinctly　states：If　〃Batoum；　Ardahan；　Kars；　or　any　of
them　shall　be　retained　by　Russia；　and　if　any　further　attempt　shall　be
made　at　any　future　time　by　Russia　to　take　possession　of　any　further
territories　of　his　Imperial　Majesty　the　Sultan　in　Asia　as　fixed　by　the
definitive　treaty　of　peace；　England　engages　to　join　his　Imperial　Majesty
the　Sultan　in　defending　them　by　force　of　arms。〃

In　a　despatch　from　Lord　Salisbury　to　Sir　A。　H。　Layard；　dated　30th　May；
1878；　these　ominous　words　are　contained：

　　　〃Even　if　it　be　certain　that　Batoum　and　Ardahan
　　　and　Kars　will　not　become　the　base　from　which
　　　emissaries　of　intrigue　will　issue　forth；　to　be　in　due
　　　time　followed　by　invading　armies；　the　mere　retention
　　　of　them　by　Russia　will　exercise　a　powerful　influence
　　　in　disintegrating　the　Asiatic　dominion　of　the　Porte。〃

In　the　same　lengthy　despatch　the　conditions　are　described　which　Turkey
must　fulfil　in　reforming　the　abuses　of　the　present　administration；　&c。
&c。；　and　there　can　be　no　doubt　that　the　British　government　contemplated
the　necessity　of　supplanting　a　considerable　number　of　the　peculant
Turkish　officials　by　experienced　English　officers；　whose　supervision
would　ensure　the　necessary　reforms。　If　such　a　course　should　have　been
accepted　by　the　Porte　there　could　be　no　question　of　the　salutary　effect；
as　the　presence　of　British　officials　in　actual　authority　throughout　the
provinces　of　Asia　Minor　would　have　proved　to　the　various　races　our